March 20, 2025 | Volume 32, Issue 8
This Report summarizes opinions issued on February 26 and March 4 and 5, 2025 (Part I); and cases granted review on March 3 and 10, 2025 (Part II).
Opinions
City and County of San Franscisco v. Environmental Protection Agency, 23-753.
By a 5-4 vote, the Court held that the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) exceeded the authority granted to it under the Clean Water Act (CWA) by including generic provisions in a National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permit that made the permittee responsible for ensuring the quality of the water in the body of water into which the permittee discharges pollutants. The CWA prohibits the discharge of pollutants into bodies of water in the United States unless expressly authorized. One such authorization comes from NPDES permits, which the EPA may issue to allow discharges. To ensure that allowed discharges comply with the CWA, the EPA has the authority to place certain conditions on these permits. Specifically, §1311(b) authorizes the imposition of technology-based effluent limitations on permits, which restrict the “quantities, rates, and concentrations” of harmful materials that permittees may discharge. §1311(b)(1)(A). When that is not sufficient to ensure water quality standards are met, the EPA under §1311(b)(1)(C) may also impose “any more stringent limitation, including those necessary to meet water quality standards . . . or required to implement any applicable water quality standard.”
In 2019, the EPA added two conditions on an NPDES permit granted to a wastewater facility owned by San Francisco. The first prohibited the facility from making any discharge that “contributes to a violation of any applicable water quality standard” for receiving waters. The second prohibited San Francisco from performing any treatment or making any discharge that “create[s] pollution, contamination, or nuisance as defined by California Water Code section 13050.” San Francisco appealed the issuance of its permit, with these new requirements, to the EPA’s Environmental Appeals Board. After the board rejected San Francisco’s appeal, the city filed a petition for review in the Ninth Circuit. A divided Ninth Circuit denied the petition, holding that the challenged requirements were permissible because §1311(b)(1)(C) authorizes the EPA to impose “any” limitation designed to ensure that applicable water body standards are met in a receiving body of water. In an opinion by Justice Alito, the Court reversed and remanded.
The Court began by rejecting San Francisco’s broader argument that all “limitations” imposed under §1311 must qualify as “effluent limitations.” Examining the statutory text, the Court pointed out that while §1311(b)(1)(A) and (B) refer to “effluent limitations,” §1311(b)(1)(C) does not. It instead refers to “any more stringent limitation.” The Court presumed that Congress acted purposely in excluding “effluent” from §1311(b)(1)(C). And that exclusion signaled to the Court that Congress intended that §1311(b)(1)(C) would authorize the imposition of limitations other than those deemed “effluent.”
The Court then addressed, and ultimately agreed with, San Francisco’s narrower argument that even if not limited to effluent limitations, §1311(b)(1)(C) “does not authorize the EPA to impose NPDES permit requirements that condition permitholders’ compliance on whether receiving waters meet applicable water quality standards.” The Court concluded that the most natural reading of §1311(b)(1)(C) is that “it authorizes the EPA to set rules that a permittee must follow in order to achieve a desired result, namely a certain degree of water quality.” The Court found that the challenged conditions, which it characterized as “end-result requirements,” did not do that. Instead, the Court noted that these requirements merely make a permittee responsible for the quality of the water in the body of water into which the permittee discharges pollutants. Because they were devoid of direction from the EPA as to what San Francisco must do to achieve a particular result, the conditions did not qualify as “limitations” under §1311(b)(1)(C).
The Court then explained how its interpretation was the only one that made sense when viewed in light of the CWA’s history. Under the EPA’s reading of §1311(b)(1)(C), “a permittee may be held liable if the quality of the water into which it discharges pollutants fails to meet water quality standards.” When Congress overhauled federal water pollution control legislation in 1972, it excised a provision that did exactly that. The new version of the Act did not include any language that was remotely similar. Noting that this omission was the result of a “deliberate and prominent policy choice,” the Court concluded that the EPA’s interpretation would undo what Congress plainly sought to achieve through its overhaul. The Court further found that two features of the CWA’s broader statutory scheme pointed in favor of its interpretation. First, the permit shield provision of the CWA―under which a permittee is deemed in compliance with the CWA and thus protected from penalty if it follows all the terms of its permit―would be nullified if the EPA’s interpretation was accepted. Second, the EPA’s interpretation does not resolve what happens when more than one permittee discharges into a body of water with substandard water quality.
Justice Barrett dissented in part, joined by Justices Sotomayor, Kagan, and Jackson. In the dissent’s view, §1311(b)(1)(C) plainly allows for inclusion of the challenged limitations in the city’s permit. “The relevant provision of the Clean Water Act directs EPA to impose ‘any more stringent limitation’ that is ‘necessary to meet . . . or required to implement any applicable water quality standard.’ 33 U. S. C. §1311(b)(1)(C). Conditions that forbid the city to violate water quality standards are plainly ‘limitations’ on the city’s license to discharge.” The dissent pointed out that the “entire function of §1311(b)(1)(C) is to ensure that permitted discharges do not violate state water quality standards.” And this provision gives the EPA broad authority to achieve that objective by imposing conditions in NPDES permits. Thus, the dissent questioned, “[w]hy would that broad authority not allow the EPA to tell permittees that they must not cause or contribute to a violation of the very standards that §1311(b)(1)(C) serves to safeguard?”
Waetzig v. Halliburton Energy Services, Inc., 23-971.
The Court unanimously held that a voluntary dismissal without prejudice pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a) counts as a “final proceeding” and thus qualifies for relief under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b). Rule 41(a) allows a plaintiff to dismiss his case “without a court order” if he serves “a notice of dismissal before the opposing party serves either an answer or a motion for summary judgment.” Rule 60(b) authorizes a court, “[o]n motion and just terms,” to “relieve a party . . . from a final judgment, order, or proceeding” for six enumerated reasons, including “mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect.”
Petitioner Gary Waetzig filed an age discrimination lawsuit against his former employer, Halliburton Energy Services, in federal district court. Shortly thereafter, upon acquiescing to Halliburton’s request to arbitrate his claim, he voluntarily dismissed this case under Rule 41(a). After Waetzig lost at arbitration, he returned to federal court and filed a motion under the docket number of his previously dismissed case, asking the court to reopen the case and vacate the arbitration award. Finding the authority to do so under Rule 60(b), the district court reopened the case. After doing so, the court issued a separate order granting Waetzig’s motion to vacate the arbitration award. On appeal, the Tenth Circuit reversed the district court’s order reopening Waetzig’s case under Rule 60(b). The court held that a voluntary dismissal without prejudice could not be a “final proceeding” for purposes of Rule 60(b) because it does not involve a “judicial determination with finality.” In an opinion by Justice Alito, the Court reversed and remanded.
The Court began by holding that a voluntary dismissal without prejudice is “final” for purposes of Rule 60(b). The Court noted that voluntary dismissals without prejudice fit comfortably within the definition of “final” found in legal dictionaries at the time the term first appeared in the Rule in 1946. And the Court recognized that the Federal Rules Advisory Committee’s Notes that accompanied the 1946 amendments to Rule 60(b) confirm its straightforward interpretation of the term. In these notes, the Committee stated that it added “final” to exclude “interlocutory judgments” from the Rule’s reach. The Court found that a voluntary dismissal without prejudice was “final” rather than “interlocutory,” under the Committee notes description, because it “terminates the case and strips a court of its equitable power to revise its earlier rulings.” In construing the term, the Court also rejected Halliburton’s narrower definition of “final” taken from federal appellate jurisdiction statutes. The Court found no reason to import the meaning of the term as it is used in these statutes to Rule 60(b) because the purpose behind finality in appellate jurisdiction―to promote the orderly progress of a case―does not translate to the Rule 60(b) context.
The Court next held that a voluntary dismissal without prejudice counts as a “proceeding” under Rule 60(b). The Court again cited to how legal dictionaries defined the term when it first appeared in the Rule in 1938, noting that these definitions suggested that the term encompassed “all steps in an action, including the filing of papers that are noted on the docket.” The Court pointed out that such an interpretation of “proceeding” comports with how other Federal Rules, like Rules 37 and 41, treat the term. And the Court declined Halliburton’s suggestion to read characteristics of the terms “judgment” and “order” into the meaning of “proceeding,” words that come before it in Rule 60(b). While recognizing that statutory terms must be read in context with their neighbors, the Court noted that to read “proceeding” in this way would “strip it of any independent meaning.” The Court found that its broader interpretation of the term comports with the general structure of Rule 60(b), which speaks “in an ascending order of generality.”
The Court thus held that a Rule 41(a) voluntary dismissal without prejudice counts as a “final proceeding” under Rule 60(b) and instructed that “when the requirements of Rule 60(b) are satisfied, a district court may relieve a party from such a dismissal and reopen the case.” The Court expressed no view on whether that relief was proper in Waetzig’s case. Nor did it reach the question whether the court below could exercise jurisdiction over Waetzig’s motion to vacate the arbitration award. Instead, the Court left these issues to be resolved by the lower court on remand.
Dewberry Group, Inc. v. Dewberry Engineers Inc., 23-900:
The Court unanimously held that in a trademark infringement suit under the federal Lanham Act, an award of “defendant’s profits” only awards profits properly ascribable to the defendant itself and not separately incorporated affiliates that were not parties to the suit. Dewberry Engineers provides real-estate development for commercial entities across the country and particularly in several southeastern states. It also holds the registered trademark in the word “Dewberry,” giving it exclusive rights to use the name in offering real-estate services. Dewberry Group (Group) is also a commercial real-estate company operating in the southeast, owned by developer John Dewberry. The Group provides all of the financial, legal, operational, and marketing services to other, separately incorporated affiliated companies who own commercial properties for lease. The affiliates receive the rental income from the properties they own and the Group receives its agreed-upon fees for providing its services. The Group operates at a loss and receives occasional cash infusions from John Dewberry, who also owns each of the affiliates who are profiting in the tens of millions.
Dewberry Engineers had sued the Group for trademark infringement, leading to a settlement that limited the Group’s use of the Dewberry name. But the Group resumed using the Dewberry name decades later. Dewberry Engineers again sued the Group for trademark infringement and unfair competition under the Lanham Act. The district court found the Group liable on all counts. When awarding damages, the court concluded that the Group’s illicit conduct was showing up exclusively on the affiliates’ books and chose to treat the Group and its affiliates as a single corporate entity for the purposes of calculating the profits award. A divided Fourth Circuit panel affirmed the award, pointing to the economic reality of the Group’s relationship with its affiliates. The majority thought that to hold otherwise would give businesses a blueprint for using corporate formalities to insulate their bad acts from financial consequences. In an opinion by Justice Kagan, the Court reversed and remanded.
The Court began with the text of the Lanham Act, noting that Dewberry Engineers was entitled to “recover [the] defendant’s profits.” 15 U.S.C. §1117(a). Under the plain meaning of “defendant,” only the party against whom relief was sought is liable for the profit award under §1117(a). In this case, Dewberry Group was the only named defendant; its affiliates’ profits could therefore not be awarded under the plain text. Second, the Court found that the award disrupted bedrock common law corporate principles. Corporate law does not treat affiliated companies as a single corporate entity, instead treating them as separate legal units with distinct legal rights and obligations. Reading the federal statute to incorporate bedrock common law principles, the Court concluded that respect for corporate formalities must remain in place. This was particularly true where, as here, the plaintiff did not seek to pierce the corporate veil or otherwise seek an exception to corporate separateness.
The Court declined to interpret the Fourth Circuit’s profit award as an application of the just-sum provision found later in §1117(a), which provides: “If the court shall find that the amount of the recovery based on profits is either inadequate or excessive[,] the court may in its discretion enter judgment for such sum as the court shall find to be just, according to the circumstances.” The Court noted that the decisions of the courts below made clear that the profit award simply treated the affiliates’ profits as the “defendant’s profits” and not a just-sum calculation. The Court expressed no view on Dewberry Engineers’ construction of the just-sum provision of §1117(a) or whether forfeiture prevented its application on remand. It also reserved the government’s proposal that an analysis of the “defendant’s profits” could consider “the economic realities of a transaction” to identify the defendant’s “true financial gain.”
Justice Sotomayor wrote a concurring opinion. She joined the Court’s holding in full but wrote separately to discuss how courts do not need to ignore economic realities or accept a defendant’s attempt to obscure its financial gain through arrangements with its affiliates. She noted that in the tax context the Court has recognized that it is possible to account for anticipatory assignment schemes without contravening principles of corporate separateness. She emphasized that companies cannot evade accountability through creative accounting and encouraged the court below to consider reopening the record if appropriate to calculate an appropriate disgorgement award under the Lanham Act.
Bufkin v. Collins, 23-713.
“When evaluateing a veteran’s claim for service-related disability benefits, the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) applies a unique standard of proof known as the ‘benefit-of-the-doubt rule.’ This rule requires the VA to ‘give the benefit of the doubt to the claimant’ whenever ‘there is an approximate balance of positive and negative evidence’ on any issue material to the claim. 38 U.S.C. §5107(b). When reviewing the VA’s benefits decisions, the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims (Veterans Court) must ‘take due account’ of the VA’s application of the benefit-of-the-doubt rule. §7261(b)(1).” By a 7-2 vote, the Court held that “the VA’s determination that the evidence is in approximate balance is a predominantly factual determination reviewed only for clear error.”
Petitioners are veterans who sought review of their service-connected PTSD disability-benefit claims. Veterans seeking these types of claims must show medical evidence diagnosing the condition and linking the veteran’s symptoms with an “in-service stressor” as well as credible evidence that the stressor occurred. With this information, the VA assigns the veteran a disability rating that determines the amount of compensation a veteran receives. The veteran then submits a request for benefits to the VA. A regional VA office adjudicates the claim. As explained above, Congress designed the VA review process to give the benefit of the doubt to a claimant where there is an “approximate balance” between positive and negative evidence regarding any issue material to the claim. §5107(b). If the veteran receives an adverse decision from the VA, the veteran may seek de novo review from the Board of Veterans’ Appeals. If a claimant receives an adverse decision from the Board, he may appeal to the Veterans Court. Veterans Court review is governed by §7261(a), under which that court decides questions of law and can set aside VA findings, conclusions, rules, and regulations that are arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law. The court’s review of factual findings is based on a “clearly erroneous” standard. Relevant to this case, the Veterans Court’s review is further regulated by §7261(b)(1), which (as explained) provides that the Veterans Court must “take due account” of the VA’s application of the benefit-of-the-doubt rule.
In petitioners’ cases, the Veterans Court upheld the Board’s decisions rejecting petitioners’ claims (i.e., finding the evidence was not in approximate balance). In doing so, the Veterans Court concluded that the Board’s approximate-balance determinations were not clearly erroneous. Petitioners appealed the Veterans Court decisions to the Federal Circuit. They argued that the “take due account” provision requires the Veterans Court to review the entire record de novo and decide for itself whether the evidence is in approximate balance. The Federal Circuit disagreed and affirmed the Veterans Court. The Federal Circuit concluded that the “take due account” command does not require the Veterans Court to conduct any review of the benefit-of-the-doubt issue beyond the clear-error review required by §7261(a). In an opinion by Justice Thomas, the Court affirmed.
The Court drew two conclusions from its evaluation the VA review process. First, it held that when the Veterans Court reviews the VA’s application of the benefit-of-the-doubt rule, that appellate tribunal must use the same standards of review that apply to its assessment of any other VA claim determination. The Court based this conclusion on the text of §7261(b)(1). It concluded that the “take due account” language directs the Veterans Court to give appropriate attention to the VA’s application of the benefit of the doubt rule, i.e., to apply the appropriate standard of review prescribed by §7261(a)—de novo for conclusions of law and clear error for findings of fact. Second, the Court found that clear-error review applies to the VA’s approximate-balance determination. The Court observed that the approximate-balance determination is a two-step process. First, the VA reviews each item of evidence and assigns it a weight. Second, the VA determines whether the evidence is in approximate balance. The Court concluded that this analysis is a mixed question of law and fact, requiring weighing the evidence and then applying a legal standard. The Court found that this particular mixed question necessarily immerses the Board in case-specific factual issues that should be reviewed with deference.
The Court distinguished the approximate-balance determination from a probable-cause determination, which is a mixed question that calls for de novo review. The Court reasoned that a probable-cause determination applies a constitutional standard, which carries a strong presumption for de novo review. The Court noted that the probable-cause determination requires substantial legal work that requires de novo review to ensure uniform precedent. Unlike probable cause, the approximate-balance determination is a creature of statute and is case specific and fact intensive, which is unlikely to generate guidance for future cases. The Court rejected any reading of the phrase “take due account” as establishing a new standard of review, noting that had Congress intended to do so it could have explicitly done so instead of incorporating the pre-existing standards of review set forth in subsection (a). The Court also rejected any suggestion that its reading rendered the “take due account” language superfluous. The Court explained that “Congress’s amendment makes express the Veterans Court’s obligation to review challenges to the VA’s application of the benefit-of-the-doubt rule according to the standards set forth in §7261(a).” And it might authorize sua sponte review of the VA’s application of the benefit-of-the-doubt rule.
Justice Jackson filed a dissenting opinion, which Justice Gorsuch joined. The dissent maintained that the Court’s conclusion essentially rendered subsection (b)(1) meaningless. The dissent said that Congress enacted (b)(1) as a response to veterans’ groups’ complaints that judicial review by the Veterans Court was too deferential. The dissent therefore proposed reading (b)(1) as requiring the Veterans Court to engage in separate, concurrent review of the VA’s compliance with the benefit-of-the-doubt rule “in making” determinations under subsection (a). The dissent also disagreed with the Court’s insistence that the approximate-balance assessment conducted under §5107(a) is primarily fact-bound. It pointed to other “fact-sensitive” inquiries that are reviewed by appellate courts de novo—probable-cause determinations and sufficiency-of-evidence inquiries. The dissent stressed that the Veterans Court’s role in a unique administrative scheme suggests that it is well-equipped to review the VA’s approximate balance determination de novo.
Cases Granted Review
Chiles v. Salazar, 24-539.
The Court will decide whether a Colorado law that prohibits mental health professionals from engaging in conversion therapy with minor clients violates the First Amendment’s Free Speech Clause. In 2019, Colorado added the Minor Conversion Therapy Law (MCTL) to its laws governing the licensing and regulation of mental health professionals. The law subjects a mental health professional to discipline, ranging from admonition to license revocation, if the professional administers conversion therapy on a minor client. Colorado defines conversion therapy as “any practice or treatment . . . that attempts or purports to change an individual’s sexual orientation or gender identity, including efforts to change behaviors or gender expressions or to eliminate or reduce sexual or romantic attraction or feelings toward individuals of the same sex.”
Petitioner Kaley Chiles is a licensed professional counselor in Colorado who engages in Christian-based counseling services. Chiles works with adults and young people with various mental health needs, including issues related to gender dysphoria and sexual attractions. Chiles brought a pre-enforcement challenge under 42 U.S.C. §1983 contending, among other things, that the MCTL violates the Free Speech Clause. The district court denied Chiles’s motion for a preliminary injunction, and the Tenth Circuit affirmed. 116 F.4th 1178. Citing to NIFLA v. Becerra, 585 U.S. 755 (2018), the Tenth Circuit recognized that professional speech is not a unique category exempt from ordinary First Amendment principles. But the court noted that the Supreme Court in NIFLA also made clear that the First Amendment does not preclude states from regulating professional conduct, even though that conduct incidentally involves speech. The court applied that principle here. It found that the MCTL regulates mental health providers’ professional conduct―specifically talk therapy―a health care treatment. And it determined that the MCTL implicates speech only as part of the practice of this mental health treatment, which is subject to reasonable licensing by the state. The court concluded that “the First Amendment permits states to regulate the professional practice of conversion therapy as an unsafe and ineffective health care treatment, even when it involves speech.”
In her petition, Chiles argues that the MCTL violates her First Amendment right to express her views on how best to help minor clients who are struggling with their sexuality and gender. She contends that the Tenth Circuit erroneously blessed Colorado’s censorship of her viewpoint on these topics, one with which Colorado disagrees, by labeling counseling speech “conduct.” Chiles points out that in NIFLA the Supreme Court made clear that the state cannot treat speech differently under the First Amendment just because it occurs within a professional setting. And she claims that, although labeled as treatment, the counseling prohibited by the MCTL consists entirely of speech. Thus, in her view, the MCTL does not incidentally burden speech; it targets it. Because that conduct consists solely of communicating a message, Chiles asserts that the counseling at issue is fully protected by the First Amendment, and the Tenth Circuit erred by concluding otherwise. Chiles also contends that the MCTL discriminates based on viewpoint by prohibiting certain people―licensed counselors―from communicating certain viewpoints regarding sexuality and gender.
Respondents―Patty Salazar, the Executive Director of the Colorado Department of Regulatory Agencies, and members of the Colorado Board of Licensed Professional Counselor Examiners and the Board of Addiction Counselor Examiners―counter that the First Amendment does not relieve licensed health care providers from their duty to provide treatment that is consistent with their fields’ standard of care. They contend that the Tenth Circuit engaged in a straightforward application of existing Supreme Court precedent to hold that the First Amendment allows for the regulation of an unsafe and ineffective healthcare treatment, such as conversion therapy, even when that treatment involves speech.
Berk v. Choy, 24-440.
The Court will resolve whether a state law providing that a complaint must be dismissed unless it is accompanied by an expert affidavit may be applied in federal court. Delaware, like many states, has a statutory requirement that complaints for medical negligence be accompanied by an affidavit of merit (AOM). These AOMs must be signed by an expert witness and assert that there appear to be reasonable grounds substantiating the alleged medical negligence. Petitioner Harold Berk brought a medical malpractice claim against respondents in the District Court of Delaware, based on diversity jurisdiction. In response to respondents’ motions, the district court dismissed Berk’s claims for failure to comply with Delaware’s AOM statute. Berk appealed to the Third Circuit, which affirmed in an unpublished opinion. 2024 WL 3534482. The Third Circuit concluded that the AOM statute did not conflict with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (specifically Rules 8, 9, 11, and 12) and that the AOM statute is “substantive state law” that should be applied in federal court.
Berk argues that the Third Circuit is on the incorrect side of a 6-2 circuit split. He asserts that Rules 8(a), 9, 11, and 12 “answer the question in dispute” of what constitutes a sufficient pleading and that the Delaware AOM statute conflicts with those basic pleading rules. Bark maintains that the AOM statute impermissibly adds a requirement to a plaintiff’s pleading in conflict with these rules.
Respondent agrees with the Third Circuit’s reasoning and application of the Erie doctrine. First, respondents contend that the AOM statute does not conflict with the federal rules. The AOM statute does not conflict with the basic pleading requirements of Rules 8 and 9 because the AOM is not a part of the pleading and does not affect the degree of specificity in a plaintiff’s pleadings. The AOM statute does not conflict with Rule 11 because it governs distinct spheres of conduct. The former concerns an expert witness’s conduct while the latter concerns an attorney’s. Finally, say respondents, the AOM statute does not conflict with Rule 12 because the statute is not a pleading standard.
Barrett v. United States, 24-5774.
At issue is whether the Double Jeopardy Clause prohibits the imposition of two sentences for an act that violates both 18 U.S.C. §924(c) and (j). Petitioner Dwayne Barrett was convicted, among other crimes, of aiding the use of a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §924(c)(1)(A); and aiding the use of a firearm to commit murder during a crime of violence, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §924(j)(1) and (2). These convictions were both based on Barrett’s involvement in an armed robbery during which Gamar Dafalla was shot and killed. Barrett received a 25-year consecutive sentence on his §924(j) conviction. He was not sentenced on his §924(c) conviction because the district court found that offense to be a lesser-included offense of the §924(j) conviction. In a decision remanding Barrett’s case for resentencing, the Second Circuit directed the district court to impose separate sentences for his §924(c) and §924(j) convictions based on the robbery and murder of Dafalla. 102 F.4th 60. Relying on the Supreme Court’s construction of these statutes in Lora v. United States, 599 U.S. 453 (2023), the Second Circuit held that §924(c)(1) and §924(j) are “separate offenses for which Congress has clearly authorized cumulative punishments,” even when predicated on the same underlying crime.
Barrett asserts that the imposition of sentences for each conviction, in these circumstances, violates the Double Jeopardy Clause. Relying on Whalen v. United States, 445 U.S. 684 (1980), Barrett states that when “two statutory provisions proscribe the ‘same offense,’” courts are prohibited from imposing “two punishments for that offense” unless Congress clearly indicated otherwise. He contends that this holding controls here. Barrett points out that §924(c) does not have distinct elements from §924(j). Thus, where convictions under each statute arise out of the same conduct, the Double Jeopardy Clause prohibits punishment for each conviction unless Congress clearly authorized a court to do so. According to Barrett, neither statute indicates clear legislative intent to authorize multiple punishments. (Although the United States opposed certiorari, it acknowledged that it “has long taken the position that cumulative punishment under Section 924(c) and (j) for the same use of a firearm is not permitted.”)
NAAG Center for Supreme Court Advocacy Staff
- Dan Schweitzer, Director and Chief Counsel
- Sianha Gualano, Supreme Court Fellow
- Nicole Nixon, Supreme Court Fellow
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