New York et al. v. Cephalon, No. 2:16-cv-04234 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 4, 2016)
In May 2015, the FTC settled a “pay-for-delay” suit against Cephalon for injunctive relief and $1.2 billion, which was paid into an escrow account. The FTC settlement allowed for those escrow funds to be distributed for settlement of certain related cases and government investigations. In August 2016, forty-eight states filed suit in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania against Cephalon alleging anticompetitive conduct by Cephalon to protect the profits it earned from having a patent-protected monopoly on the sale of its landmark drug, Provigil. According to the complaint, Cephalon’s conduct delayed generic versions of Provigil from entering the market for several years. The complaint alleged that as patent and regulatory barriers that prevented generic competition to Provigil neared expiration, Cephalon intentionally defrauded the Patent and Trademark Office to secure an additional patent, which a court subsequently deemed invalid and unenforceable. Before it was declared invalid, Cephalon was able to use the patent to delay generic competition for nearly six additional years by filing patent infringement lawsuits. Cephalon settled those lawsuits by paying competitors to delay sale of their generic versions of Provigil until at least April 2012. Consumers, states, and others paid millions more for Provigil than they would have had generic versions of the drug launched by early 2006, as expected. A settlement was filed with the complaint, which includes $35 million for distribution to consumers who bought Provigil.
Massachusetts et al. v. Koninklijke Ahold N.V., No. 1:16-cv-01412 (D.D.C., July 25, 2016)
Plaintiff states and FTC filed suit challenging the merger of Ahold and Delhaize, supermarket chains operating in the United States as Stop & Shop and Hannafords. According to the complaint, supermarkets operated by Ahold and Delhaize compete closely for shoppers based on price, format, service, product offerings, promotional activity, and location. Without a remedy, the merger would eliminate direct supermarket competition to the detriment of consumers in these local markets. As a result, the merger would increase the likelihood that the combined company could unilaterally exercise market power, and that the remaining competitors could coordinate their behavior to raise prices. the parties agreed to divest 76 supermarkets in the plaintiff states. The settlement also required prior notification of future supermarket purchases and $300,000 in attorneys fees and costs.
Florida et al. v. Dollar Tree, Inc., No. 1:15-cv-01052 (D.D.C. July 2, 2015)
Eighteen plaintiff states and the FTC challenged the merger of Dollar Tree, the largest chain of “dollar” stores (deep discount stores) and Family Dollar Stores, the nation’s third largest dollar store chain. The complaint claimed the proposed acquisition would substantially lessen competition in numerous markets by: (1) eliminating direct and substantial competition between Dollar Tree and Family Dollar; and (2) increasing the likelihood that Dollar Tree will unilaterally exercise market power. This, according to the complaint, would violate Section 7 of the Clayton Act and each state’s applicable antitrust and consumer protection laws. The states sought a permanent injunction to prevent the merger, along with costs and attorney fees. The parties reached a settlement under which 330 stores in the 18 states would be divested to Sycamore partners and run as a new dollar store chain, Dollar Express. The agreement also required the defendants to report future acquisitions in any of the affected markets and to pay over $865,000 to reimburse the costs and fees of the plaintiff states.
Massachusetts v. Partners Healthcare System Inc. et al., no. 14-2033 (Mass. Super. Ct. June 24 2014)
State challenged by acquisition by Partners of South Shore, alleging that it would substantially lessen competition in portions of Eastern Massachusetts for the provision of general acute care inpatient health services in violation of state law. After extensive hearings, the Attorney General proposed a settlement. The court permitted extensive public comment and the settlement was ultimately rejected. The parties abandoned the transaction.
Maryland et al. v. Perrigo Company, No. 1:04CV01398 (D.D.C. Aug. 17, 2004)
The FTC and states alleged that the companies had entered into a “pay-for-delay” arrangement, whereby Perrigo paid Alpharma to withdraw its generic version from the market for Children’t ibuprofen.According to the complaint, in June 1998, Perrigo and Alpharma signed an agreement allocating to Perrigo the sale of OTC children’s liquid ibuprofen for seven years. In exchange for agreeing not to compete, Alpharma received an up-front payment and a royalty on Perrigo’s sales of children’s liquid ibuprofen. The FTC received $6.25 million to compensate injured consumers. The states received $1.5 million in lieu of civil penalties. the parties were enjoined from future agreements.
In the Matter of Aggregate Industries, PLC, No. 02-3947 (Mass. Super. Ct. Suffolk Cty., Sept. 6, 2002)
USDOJ and plaintiff state challenged acquisition by British aggregate company of a local aggregate company with concrete plants serving eastern Massachusetts and New Hampshirealleging that the acquisition would reduce the number of ready-mix concrete suppliers able to service large construction projects in northern metropolitan Boston from three to two. In northern metropolitan Boston, Aggregate Industries and Wakefield often were each other’s most significant competitor. Aggregate Industries was required to divest the Wakefield facility to a third-party buyer. The state entered into an Assurance of Discontinuance with Aggregate Industries requiring it to relinquish a lease on another concrete plant in central Massachusetts.
Massachusetts v. J. Sainsbury, PLC, No. 99-2574A (Mass. Super. Ct. Suffolk Cty. Nov. 16, 2000)
State challenged the acquisition by J. Sainsbury of Star Markets supermarkets in Massachusetts. Defendant was required to divest 9 supermarkets, keep operating two others until a competitor opens up, and provide notice of future acquisitions. Consent decree was later modified to require only 8 divestitures.
Massachusetts v. McMullen et al., No. 12-512B (Comm. Ct. of Mass. Apr. 27, 2012)
State settled bid-rigging allegations with former county commissioner and pest-control company owner. According to the complaint, Plymouth County put its pest control contract for seven county buildings out for quotes and received three quotes of which Capeway Pest was not the lowest. The complaint alleges that in the days before the vote on the contract by the Board of Commissioners, Burgess spoke on multiple occasions with then Commissioner McMullen. During at least one of their phone conversations McMullen allegedly provided non-public inside information by informing Burgess that Capeway Pest did not submit the lowest quote. Using this inside information, Capeway Pest submitted a new quote that exactly matched the previous low quote. The attempt to subvert the procurement process was uncovered prior to the vote on the pest control contract, and the original low quote was accepted. McMullen and Burgess agreed to pay $5000 each in civil penalties and $2500 each in costs.
State v. Tradition (North America)
Defendant Tradition was a broker of guaranteed investment contracts (GICs), which are used to temporarily invest the proceeds of municipal bond issues. Tradition conducted the bidding process among banks that sought to sell GICs to the Commonwealth, and certified to the State that the bidding process was competitive and that the winning bid would be the GIC that provided the highest yield. The state alleged that Tradition created a rigged and corrupt bidding process by telling favored providers what other banks were bidding and also telling the favored providers exactly what to bid in order to win the business. This resulted in bids that offered Massachusetts less interest than it would have gotten if the bidding process had really been competitive. By fixing the bids, Tradition ensured that these favored providers would get business from the Commonwealth while also shortchanging Massachusetts. The state also alleged that Tradition told favored providers who had already indicated that they intended to offer certain high interest rates that these providers should offer less money to the Commonwealth. The complaint also alleged that Tradition repeatedly deceived the Commonwealth, provided false certifications regarding the bidding process. The parties reached a settlement under Tradition will pay $250,000 to Massachusetts. The settlement also includes a provision to track an ongoing investment obtained through the tainted bidding process to determine whether Tradition owes additional money to the state.
Texas et al. v. Penguin Group et al., No. 1:12-cv-03394-DLC (S.D.N.Y, Apr. 30, 2012)
TTexas and Connecticut led 33 state group that filed complaint charging three of the nation’s largest book publishers and Apple Inc. with colluding to fix the sales prices of electronic books. The States undertook a two-year investigation into allegations that the defendants conspired to raise e-book prices. Retailers had long sold e-books through a traditional wholesale distribution model, under which retailers, not publishers, set e-book sales prices. The states alleged that Penguin, Simon & Schuster and Macmillan conspired with other publishers and Apple to artificially raise prices by imposing a distribution model in which the publishers set the prices for bestsellers at $12.99 and $14.99. When Apple prepared to enter the e-book market, the publishers and Apple agreed to adopt an agency distribution model as a mechanism to allow them to fix prices. To enforce their price-fixing scheme, the publishers and Apple relied on contract terms that forced all e-book outlets to sell their products at the same price. Because the publishers agreed to use the same prices, retail price competition was eliminated. According to the States’ enforcement action, the coordinated agreement to fix prices resulted in e-book customers paying more than $100 million in overcharges. The States’ antitrust action seeks injunctive relief, damages for customers who paid artificially inflated prices for e-books and civil penalties. Case was filed in W.D. Tex., transferred to S.D.N.Y. as consolidated case. The States reached settlements with the five publishers, which granted E-book outlets greater freedom to reduce the prices of their E-book titles. Consumers nationwide received a total of $164 million in compensation. After entering into settlement agreement with all the Defendant publishers, DOJ and the states had a nearly 3 week trial against Apple in June 2013, during which numerous witnesses took the stand. On July 10, 2013, a decision was handed down in favor of the U.S. Department of Justice and the states against Apple. Trial of the damages phase is pending. United States et al. v. Apple, Inc., 12-CV-2826 (S.D.N.Y.).
