Settlement Agreement Between States and Arby’s Restaurant Group, Inc.
Fourteen states investigated “no-poach†agreements (clauses, often contained in franchise agreements, which prevent workers from switching between employers of the same franchise in order to obtain a better job with a higher salary or improved working conditions). The states settled with four national fast food franchisors, Dunkin’, Arby’s, Five Guys, and Little Caesars, who agreed to cease using “no-poach†agreements that restrict the rights of fast food workers to move from one franchise to another within the same restaurant chain. Under the terms of the settlements, the franchisors will stop including no-poach provisions in any of their franchise agreements and stop enforcing any franchise agreements already in place. The franchisors have also agreed to amend existing franchise agreements to remove no-poach provisions and to ask their franchisees to post notices in all locations to inform employees of the settlement. Finally, the franchisors will notify the attorneys general if one of their franchisees tries to restrict any employee from moving to another location under an existing no-poach provision. Since the investigation began, Wendy’s provided confirmation that it never used no-poach provisions in their contracts with franchisees. Investigations into Burger King, Popeyes, and Panera continue.
Settlement Agreement Between States and Dunkin’ Brands, Inc.
Fourteen states investigated “no-poach†agreements (clauses, often contained in franchise agreements, which prevent workers from switching between employers of the same franchise in order to obtain a better job with a higher salary or improved working conditions). The states settled with four national fast food franchisors, Dunkin’, Arby’s, Five Guys, and Little Caesars, who agreed to cease using “no-poach†agreements that restrict the rights of fast food workers to move from one franchise to another within the same restaurant chain. Under the terms of the settlements, the franchisors will stop including no-poach provisions in any of their franchise agreements and stop enforcing any franchise agreements already in place. The franchisors have also agreed to amend existing franchise agreements to remove no-poach provisions and to ask their franchisees to post notices in all locations to inform employees of the settlement. Finally, the franchisors will notify the attorneys general if one of their franchisees tries to restrict any employee from moving to another location under an existing no-poach provision. Since the investigation began, Wendy’s provided confirmation that it never used no-poach provisions in their contracts with franchisees. Investigations into Burger King, Popeyes, and Panera continue.
California et al. v. Teikoku Seikayu Co.(Lidoderm), No. 3:18-cv-00675 (N.D. Cal. 01/31/18)
Plaintiff states alleged that defendant, the producer of Lidoderm (pain medication), paid or incentivized generic drug makers to delay entry into market to protect its monopoly on Lidoderm. (“pay for delay”) The settlement agreement, which expires in twenty years, prohibits Teikoku from entering into agreements that restrict generic drug manufacturers from researching, manufacturing, marketing, or selling products for a period of time and requires Teikoku to cooperate in an ongoing investigation into similarly anticompetitive conduct by other drug manufacturers, among other things.
FTC and Plaintiff States (CA and DC) v. Draft Kings, No. 17-cv-01195 (D.D.C. 2017)
States and the FTC sued to block the merger of the two largest daily fantasy sports sites, alleging that the combined firm would control more than 90 percent of the US market for paid daily fantasy sports contests. Plaintiff states and the FTC allege that the defendants compete with each other on price and quality.
FTC, Pennsylvania and D.C. v. Staples
Two office supply “superstore” chains sought to merge. The FTC, Pennsylvania and D.C. challenged the merger and were successful in obtaining an injunction. After the parties abandoned the merger, the states sought attorneys’ fees, which were denied by the court.
State of Wisconsin et al. v. Indivior, No. 16-5073 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 22,2016)
Plaintiff states alleged that the makers of Suboxone, a drug used to treat opioid addiction, engaged in a scheme to block generic competitors and raise prices. Specifically, they are conspiring to wtich Suboxone from a tablet version to a flim in order to prevent or delay generic entry. The states allege that the manufacturers engaged in “product hopping” in which a company makes slight changes to its product to extend patent protections and prvent generic alternatives. The complaint was filed under seal.
In the Matter of NFL Ticketing Investigation, Assurance No. 16-181(NY Attorney General Antitrust Bureau (Nov. 15, 2016)
Plaintiff states entered into a settlement agreement with the National Football League under which the NFL would discontinue its league-wide mandatory price floor (no tickets could be sold on the NFL secondary market platform for a price less than a season ticket holder’s price) and would not direct or require ticketing practices designed to preclude fans from using competing ticket exchanges.
New York et al. v. Cephalon, No. 2:16-cv-04234 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 4, 2016)
In May 2015, the FTC settled a “pay-for-delay” suit against Cephalon for injunctive relief and $1.2 billion, which was paid into an escrow account. The FTC settlement allowed for those escrow funds to be distributed for settlement of certain related cases and government investigations. In August 2016, forty-eight states filed suit in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania against Cephalon alleging anticompetitive conduct by Cephalon to protect the profits it earned from having a patent-protected monopoly on the sale of its landmark drug, Provigil. According to the complaint, Cephalon’s conduct delayed generic versions of Provigil from entering the market for several years. The complaint alleged that as patent and regulatory barriers that prevented generic competition to Provigil neared expiration, Cephalon intentionally defrauded the Patent and Trademark Office to secure an additional patent, which a court subsequently deemed invalid and unenforceable. Before it was declared invalid, Cephalon was able to use the patent to delay generic competition for nearly six additional years by filing patent infringement lawsuits. Cephalon settled those lawsuits by paying competitors to delay sale of their generic versions of Provigil until at least April 2012. Consumers, states, and others paid millions more for Provigil than they would have had generic versions of the drug launched by early 2006, as expected. A settlement was filed with the complaint, which includes $35 million for distribution to consumers who bought Provigil.
United States et al. v. Aetna et. al., No. 1:16-cv-01494 (D.D.C. July 21, 2016)
U.S. DOJ and plaintiff states sued to block the merger of two of the country’s largest health insurers. According to the complaint, alleges that their merger would substantially reduce Medicare Advantage competition in more than 350 counties in 21 states, affecting more than 1.5 million Medicare Advantage customers in those counties. Before seeking to acquire Humana, Aetna had pursued aggressive expansion in Medicare Advantage. Aetna, the nation’s fourth-largest Medicare Advantage insurer by membership, has nearly doubled its Medicare Advantage footprint over the past four years. Humana is the nation’s second-largest Medicare Advantage insurer by membership. The lawsuit also alleges that Aetna’s purchase of Humana would substantially reduce competition to sell commercial health insurance to individuals and families on the public exchanges in 17 counties in Florida, Georgia and Missouri, affecting more than 700,000 people in those counties. The lawsuit alleges that by buying Humana, Aetna would eliminate one of its strongest and most capable competitors in these markets. The district court granted the injunction, rejecting the parties arguments that the Medicare Advantage and Medicare programs were competing products that constrained one another’s prices, and noting that Aetna’s exit from several markets, allegedly because of the Affordable Care Act, appeared to be designed to eliminate a problem with the merger, rather than being an unrelated business decision.
United States et al. v. Anthem et al., No. 1:16-cv-01493 (D.D.C., July 21, 2016)
The US and plaintiff states sued to block the merger of two of the country’s largest health insurers. The complaint alleges that their merger would substantially reduce competition for millions of consumers who receive commercial health insurance coverage from national employers throughout the United States; from large-group employers in at least 35 metropolitan areas, including New York, Los Angeles, San Francisco, Denver and Indianapolis; and from public exchanges created by the Affordable Care Act in St. Louis and Denver. The complaint also alleges that the elimination of Cigna threatens competition among commercial insurers for the purchase of healthcare services from hospitals, physicians and other healthcare providers. According to the complaint, the merger would eliminate substantial head-to-head competition in all these markets, and it would remove the independent competitive force of Cigna, which has been a leader in the industry’s transition to value-based care. the court granted the injunction. Anthem appealed to the DC Circuit, which affirmed the district court.
- « Previous
- 1
- 2
- 3
- 4
- Next »
